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Abstract
A simple unbreakable cipher system is presented which
uses the concept of ”pseudo-bits” that has never been used
in either classical or quantum cryptography.
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Cryptography, the art of secure communication has been developed since the
dawn of human civilization, but it has been mathematically treated by Shan-
non [1]. At present, we have different classical cryptosystems whose merits
and demerits are discussed below.
Vernam cipher [2]: It is proven secure [1] but it can not produce more
absolutely secure bits than the shared secret bits. Due to this difficulty, it
has not become popular, however it is still routinely used in diplomatic se-
cure communication.
Data encryption standard [3] and public key distribution system [4]:
These are widely used cryptosystems because they can produce more com-
putationally secure bits than the shared secret bits. The problem is that its
computational security is not proved. The assumption of computational se-
curity has now become weak after the discovery of fast quantum algorithms
(see ref. 16)
To solve the above problems of classical cryptosystem, quantum cryp-
tography [5-9] has been developed over the last two decades. Conceptually
quantum cryptography is elegant and many undiscovered possibilities might
store in it. In the last few years work on its security has been remarkably
progressed [10-14], however work is yet not finished.
Recently it is revealed [15] that all practical quantum cryptographic systems
are insecure.
Regarding quantum cryptosystems, the popular conjectures are:
1. Completely quantum channel based cryptosystem is impossible [16] (exist-
ing quantum cryptosystem requires classical channel to operate). 2. Uncon-
ditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible [16]. 3. By classical
means, it is impossible to create more absolutely secure bits than the shared
secret bits.
Recently alternative quantum cryptosystem has been developed [17-20]
by the present author; which can operate solely on quantum channel (both
entangled and unentangled type)[17,18] and can provide unconditionally se-
2
cure quantum bit commitment [19]. Here we shall see that third conjecture
is also not true.
Operational procedure: For two party protocol, the problem of Vernam
ciper (popularly called one time pad) [2] is that two users have to meet at
regular interval to exchange the key material. We observe that key material
can be simply transmitted without compromising security.
In the presented cipher system, always in the string of random bits, there
are real and pseudo-bits (fake bits). Real bits contain key material and
pseudo-bits are to mislead eavesdropper. Sender encodes the sequence of real
bits on to the fixed real bit positions and encodes the sequence of pseudo-
bits on to the fixed pseudo-bit positions. It thus forms the entire encoded
sequence. which is transmitted. The fixed positions of real and pseudo-bits
are initially secretly shared between sender and receiver. Therefore, receiver
can decode the real bits (the first key) from real bit positions. Obviously
he/she ignores the pseudo-bits.
For the second encoded sequence, sender uses new sequence of real and
pseudo-bits but the position of real and pseudo-bits are same. So again
receiver decodes the second key from the same real bit positions. In this
way infinite number of keys can be coded and decoded. Notice that initially
shared secret positions of real and pseudo-bits are repeatedly used. That’s
why, in some sense, secrecy is being amplified. Let us illustrate the procedure.


P R R R P R P R P P P R P R R P ....
0 b1 b1 b1 1 b1 1 b1 1 0 0 b1 0 b1 b1 1 ....
1 b2 b2 b2 0 b2 0 b2 0 1 1 b2 1 b2 b2 0 ....
1 b3 b3 b3 1 b3 1 b3 1 0 0 b3 0 b3 b3 0 ....
0 b4 b4 b4 1 b4 0 b4 1 0 1 b4 1 b4 b4 0 ....
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....
1 bn bn bn 1 bn 0 bn 0 0 1 bn 0 bn bn 1 ....


≡


Ss
Se1
Se2
Se3
Se4
.
.
.
Sen


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In the above block, the first row represents the sequence Ss, which is ini-
tially secretly shared. In that sequence, ”R” and ”P” denote the position of
real and pseudo- bits respectively. The next rows represent the encoded se-
quences : Se1, Se2, Se3, Se4, ...., Sen. In these encoding, bi are the real bits for
i-th real string of bits. Other bits are pseudo-bits. Obviously the sequences
of real bits always form new real keys. Similarly sequences of pseudo-bits
always form new pseudo-keys. But positions of real and pseudo-bits are un-
changed. As receiver ignores pseudo-bits and pseudo-keys, so the decoded
strings of real bits (keys) will look like:


R R R R R R R R ....
b1 b1 b1 b1 b1 b1 b1 b1 ....
b2 b2 b2 b2 b2 b2 b2 b2 ....
b3 b3 b3 b3 b3 b3 b3 b3 ....
b4 b4 b4 b4 b4 b4 b4 b4 ....
. . . . . . . . ....
. . . . . . . . ....
. . . . . . . . ....
bn bn bn bn bn bn bn bn ....


≡


Ss
K1
K2
K3
K4
.
.
.
Kn


Here K1, K2, K3, K4....., KN are independent keys.
Condition for absolute security: Shannon’s condition for absolute security
[1] is that eavesdropper has to depend on guess for absolutely secure system.
In our system, for a particular encoded sequence of events (bits), if the prob-
ability of real events (prealbits) becomes equal to the probability of pseudo-
events (ppseudo−bits) then eavesdropper has to guess. Since all the encoded
sequences are independent so eavesdropper has to guess all sequences. There-
fore, condition for absolute security can be written as: 1.ppseudo−bits ≥ prealbits.
2. All encoded sequences should be statistically independent. That is, any
encoded sequence should not have pseudo randomness.
Speed of communication: If we take ppseudo−bits = prealbits and share 100
bits, then message can be communicated at 1/4 speed of digital communica-
tion (data rate will reduce a factor of 1/2 due to key production and another
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factor of 1/2 due to message encoding) as long as we wish. If the key (Ki)
itself carries meaningful message, then speed of secure communication will
be just half of the speed of digital communication. Perhaps no popular cryp-
tosystems offer such speed.
The above art of key exchange is mainly based on the idea of pseudo-bits,
which was first introduced in our noised based cryptosystem[21]. But that
system will be slow and complicated. In contrast, this system will be fast and
simple. Note that, noise has never been a threat to the security of any classi-
cal cryptographic protocol ( rather it can be helpful [21] to achive security).
This is the main advantage of classical cryptographic protocol over quantum
key distribution protocols, where noise indeed a threat to the security. It
should be mentioned that the classical cipher system can not achieve other
quantum cryptographic tasks such as cheating free Bell’s inequality test [18]
and quantum bit commitment encoding [19]. Indeed classical cryptography
can not be encroach entire area of quantum cryptography.
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